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SCRUTINY
The House of Lords and Religious 
Clothing in Begum v. Head teacher and 
Governors of Denbigh High School
Gareth Davies*
Introduction
In 2002 Shabina Begum, then a student at Denbigh High School in Luton, decided 
that as a Muslim she was obliged by her religion to wear the jilbab, a form of 
loose clothing that conceals the shape of the body. The jilbab is commonly worn 
by Muslim women in many areas of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Muslim 
women in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, where most British Muslims have their 
roots, more commonly wear the shalwar kameeze, a more fitted garment.
The dress code at Denbigh High does not permit the jilbab, and the school was 
not inclined to change its rules. As a result Ms Begum stopped going to school and 
began legal action claiming a violation of her Article 9 ECHR right to freedom of 
religion, as protected in the UK by the Human Rights Act 1998.
The judge at first instance found against her, but the Court of Appeal reversed 
that decision.1 It found that the school dress code might well be justifiable under 
* Faculty of Law, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam. 
1 At first instance; R (on the application of Begum (by her litigation friend, Rahman)) v. Head 
teacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2004] EWHC 1389 (Admin; [2004] ELR 374. 
On appeal; CA [2005] EWCA Civ 199; [2005] 1 WLR 3372. Annotations; Poole, ‘Of Headscarves 
and Heresies: The Denbigh High School case and public authority decision making under the 
Human Rights Act’ [2005] PL 685; Davies, ‘Banning the Jilbab: Reflections on Restricting 
Religious Clothing in the Light of the Court of Appeal in SB v Denbigh High School’ (2005) 1:3 
European Constitutional Law Review 511; A. Blair and W. Apps, ‘What not to wear and other 
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Article 9(2), for example in the cause of protecting the rights and freedoms of 
others. However, in responding to Ms Begum’s request to wear the jilbab the head 
teacher and governors were obliged to consider her right to religious freedom, as 
well as other interests, such as harmony in the school, and find the appropriate 
balance. In fact they had merely considered the interests of the school as a whole 
and of other pupils, and had not accorded any weight in their decision making to 
Ms Begum’s Article 9 right. They simply took the view that she should obey the 
rules. Thus while, upon a new consideration it was quite possible that they would 
be able to justifiably arrive at the same answer, in the absence of evidence of a 
balanced consideration of her complaint the school’s decision was annulled. 
The House of Lords has now reversed this decision.2 
2. The House of Lords Judgments
2.1 The Procedural Approach
The Court of Appeal emphasized procedure as a way to protect substantive rights. It 
was difficult for judges to second-guess head teachers, but what they could do was 
make sure they had considered all the relevant factors with due seriousness. Lord 
Justice Brooke, in the leading CA judgment, produced an Article 9 checklist which 
head teachers could use to make sure their decisions were legally sound, requiring 
them to consider the impact of their decisions on the student, to critically assess 
what it was they wished to achieve with this policy, and to ask how necessary and 
proportionate their rules were, and so on.3
Four of the five judges in the HL rejected this approach, Baroness Hale not ad-
dressing the point. It was unreasonable to expect non-lawyers such as head teachers 
and governors to think in terms of human rights, and follow the argumentative 
structure of Article 9.4 They took the view that the ECHR did not contain procedural 
requirements, but substantive ones. It does not matter how national authorities 
make their decisions, as long as they do not, in fact, violate rights: ‘what matters 
in any case is the practical outcome, not the quality of the decision-making process 
stories: addressing religious diversity in schools’ (2005) 17 Education and the Law 1; Scolnicov, ‘A 
dedicated follower of (religious) fashion’ (2005) 64 CLJ 527. For comparison with the position in 
other European countries see O. Gerstenberg, ‘Germany: Freedom of conscience in public schools’ 
(2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 94; K. Berthou, ‘The Issue of the Voile in the 
Workplace in France: Unveiling Discrimination’ (2005) 21 International Journal of Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations 281. For context see G. Anthony, ‘Public Law, Pluralism and 
Religion in Europe: Accomodating the Challenge of Globalisation’ (2006) 17 ERPL 47.
2 [2006] 2 WLR 719; [2006] UKHL 15.
3 Paras 75-76 CA, note 1 above.
4 Even, apparently, if they had help from solicitors: para. 31 HL, note 2 above.
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that led to it’.5 Lord Bingham said that procedure could not be used as a way of 
avoiding the difficult question of the ban’s legitimacy; the Court must face that 
squarely and decide it ‘objectively’.6
2.2 Was There an Interference With Religious Freedom?
Article 9 ECHR provides that limitations of religious freedom may be justified 
by other interests. Lord Nicholls and Baroness Hale felt that the limitation in this 
case was so justified. Lords Hoffmann, Scott and Bingham however felt that there 
was no interference (the word they preferred to ‘limitation’) and so no need to 
consider justification. 
Lord Bingham summarized the position most clearly: ‘The Strasbourg institu-
tions have not been at all ready to find an interference with the right to manifest 
religious belief in practice or observance where a person has voluntarily accepted an 
employment or role which does not accommodate that practice or observance and 
there are other means open to the person to practice or observe his or her religious 
without undue hardship or inconvenience’.7 Given that Ms Begum had known of 
the dress code when she began at Denbigh High, and indeed had complied with it 
for two years before she felt the need to wear the jilbab, and given that there were 
other schools in the area which permitted the jilbab and there was ‘no evidence 
to show that there was any real difficulty in her attending one or other of these 
schools’, there was no interference.8 The reasoning of Lords Hoffmann and Scott 
was similar, although Lord Hoffmann expressed some concerns about the precise 
standard of difficulty necessary. He noted with doubt the view derivable from one 
case that interference would only arise if it had been ‘impossible’ for Ms Begum 
to find another school. It was not necessary to decide this since it did not appear 
to have been even ‘difficult’.9 
2.3 Was Any Interference Justified under Article 9(2)?
Four of the five judges agreed that the dress code was or would be justified by the 
need to protect the rights and freedoms of others, one of the grounds referred to 
in Article 9(2).10 Lords Bingham and Hoffmann considered this in the alternative, 
5 Para. 31.
6 Para. 30.
7 Para. 23.
8 Para. 25.
9 Paras 51-52.
10 See generally J. Martínez-Torrón, ‘Limitations on Religious Freedom in the Case Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) 19 Emory International Law Journal 587.
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since they found no interference anyway, whereas Lord Nicholls and Baroness Hale 
made this the basis of their decision. Lord Scott did not consider the matter.
The threats to these others can be grouped into three types, all of which were 
referred to in different ways in the judgments. Were the school to amend its dress 
code to allow the jilbab then girls who did not in fact wish to wear it might be 
pressured into doing so by family or friends, and seen as ‘less good’ Muslims if 
they did not do so. Hence their religious freedom would be limited. Secondly, 
allowing the jilbab would create two categories of Muslims within the school, 
which might lead to conflict, threatening the harmony and good functioning of the 
school as a whole, and therefore being detrimental to the rights and freedoms of at 
least some pupils within it. Thirdly, some pupils and teachers associated the jilbab 
with extreme or fundamentalist views, and would find its presence intimidating. 
Hence a prohibition protected them.
These questions are of course factual ones, and the reasons that their Lordships 
gave for accepting them varied. 11
Lord Hoffmann deferred to the trial judge, who he found to have had had ‘ample 
material’ for deciding that the scenarios were plausible.12 He also, throughout 
his judgment, accorded great weight and respect to the evidence and opinions of 
the head teacher. The other judges also did this, Lord Bingham explaining that 
to second-guess the head teacher was out of the question. The school had the 
relevant expertise and was best placed to decide, and for a court to overrule it on 
‘a matter as sensitive as this’ would be ‘irresponsible’.13 This must be seen as a 
refinement and limitation of his earlier remark that ‘the court’s approach to an issue 
of proportionality under the Convention must go beyond that traditionally adopted 
to judicial review in a domestic setting … there is no shift to a merits review, but 
the intensity of review is greater than was previously appropriate’.14
A particular reason to defer to the head teacher was because it was a good school, 
and in particular because the head teacher seemed to be a good head teacher. The 
judgments abound with references to how the school had improved since the head 
teacher came to it, how it achieved above average results and had been harmonious 
and successful in recent years. Moreover, the head teacher could not be accused of 
being anti-Muslim. She was herself born in Bengal, and permitted headscarves and 
the shalwar kameeze. Therefore she both understood and respected Islam.15
An additional factor which seemed to greatly impress some of their Lordships, 
as it has also impressed the judges in the Court of Appeal, was that the uniform 
policy had been drawn up after wide consultation with Muslim authorities and 
11 The paragraphs in which their Lordships primarily address justifications are 33-34, 58, 65, and 
98. 
12 Para. 58.
13 Para. 34.
14 Para. 30.
15 See paras 5, 34, 43, 74.
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was held by many to be compatible with mainstream Muslim dress requirements. 
This was taken by their Lordships as evidence of the fairness and tolerance of the 
school decision-makers.16 
One consequence was that Ms Begum’s desire to wear the jilbab was treated 
as somewhat odd, and, being, according to the school, not a mainstream Islamic 
position, taken less seriously. Lord Scott even thought it ‘extraordinary’ that a 
Muslim girl might not regard the shalwar kameeze as sufficiently modest.17 Lord 
Hoffmann however stated that whether or not the majority of Muslims wore one 
outfit did not make the belief of a minority that another was necessary any less 
genuine or worthy of respect.18 Nevertheless he shared the view of his colleagues 
that the school’s uniform policy should prevail.
2.4 The Liberal Argument
Baroness Hale considered that the responsibility of schools and the state was not 
just to allow freedom of religion but also to provide a place where children could 
be free from it. In order to develop as individuals and find their own thoughts, the 
state should protect them from their surroundings and family, and pressures which 
might limit their own freedom of choice.
The tension which this thought captures is between the role of the state and 
that of the family in raising children.19 What are the limits of their justifiable roles 
and powers, and when should the state assert limits to the family? Everyone may 
accept freedom of religion as an abstract principle, but freedom for families, or 
for individuals, notably women and girls? The two may not be compatible, and a 
restriction on religious expression may serve the liberty of the latter to a greater 
extent. As Baroness Hale argued, this is a fortiori when it is girls who are involved. 
To doubt the choice of adult women raises many difficult questions, but to accept 
the choices of girls as being automatically and authentically their own is equally 
difficult. 
16 Several judges also mentioned that the fact that the school allowed the shalwar kameeze and 
headscarf indicated that it respected diversity and was flexible, clearly implying that Ms Begum’s 
case was thereby weakened (see paras 34, 83, 98). This is diversity as some kind of box to be 
checked, after which one can move on. On the contrary, it is an ongoing obligation. The idea that 
tolerating one religious group can reduce or remove the obligation to respect another is odd. 
17 Para. 83.
18 Para. 50.
19 See L. Lundy, ‘Family Values in the Classroom? Reconciling Parental Wishes and Children’s 
Rights in State Schools’ (2005) 19 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 346; M. 
Levinson, ‘Liberalism Versus Democracy? Schooling Private Citizens in the Public Square’ (1997) 
27 British Journal of Political Science 333; F. Radnay, ‘Culture, Religion and Gender’ [2003] 1 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 663, cited by Baroness Hale.
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She did not take her argument to the conclusion that there should be, for example, 
no religious schools, and nor did she rely on it exclusively in her final decision. It 
was for her an additional reason why the school’s decision could be justified.
3. Comment
The proposition that there was no limitation of religious freedom is not wholly 
convincing. Their Lordships relied on a number of ECHR cases in which rules 
impacting on religious practice were not found to be limitations. These include 
employers requiring employees to work on Sundays, and rules concerning animal 
welfare under which kosher slaughtering was illegal.20 
What their Lordships did not address is the distinction between rules that are not 
in any sense intended to be regulation of religion or religious expression, but have 
some incidental effect on it – such as the above examples – and those whose effect 
on religious expression is part of their purpose and intent. Examples of the latter 
include rules prohibiting certain kinds of religious clothing because it is religious 
clothing (rather than simply because it is e.g. unsafe for a fireman or motorcyclist). 
In almost all ECHR cases involving such rules, and in both of the most recent 
and leading cases, Dahlab and Sahin, which concerned, respectively, schools 
and universities prohibiting the Islamic headscarf, the Court of Human Rights, in 
Sahin in Grand Chamber, emphasized that the rules were limitations on religious 
freedom.21 Contrary to the suggestion of Lord Hoffmann,22 a careful reading of 
Sahin does not unequivocally suggest that a limitation was only found in that case 
because there were no alternative Turkish universities where the headscarf did not 
apply. The Court of Human Rights seems rather to have adopted the straightforward 
position, as in Dahlab, that a deliberate prohibition of religious clothing by a public 
institution falls within Article 9 and must be justified.23 
It is the consideration of possible justifications that is the most interesting part 
of Begum. Both courts and societies in Europe will find that balancing religious 
freedom against the justifications for restricting religious clothing is politically and 
20 See Stedman v. United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR CD 168; Konttinen v. Finland (1996) 87-A DR 
68; Ahmad v. United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 126; Jewish Liturgical Association Cha’are Shalom 
Ve Tsedek v. France (2000) 9 BHRC 27.
21 Dahlab v. Switzerland no 42393/98 (dec) ECHR 2001-V; Application no 4474/98 Sahin v. Turkey 
(2005) 41 EHRR 8 (Chamber); Judgment of 10 November 2005 (Grand Chamber).
22 Para. 59.
23 For fuller discussion of this point see Davies, ‘(Not Yet) Taking Rights Seriously: the House of 
Lords in Begum v. Head teacher and Governors of Denbigh High School’ Human Rights and 
Human Welfare Online Working Paper no. 37, available at <www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/working> or 
<ssrn.com>.
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legally unavoidable for some time to come,24 and this is the House of Lords’ first 
chance to share its views.
One of the justifications which their Lordships accepted is a bad one. The fact that 
some pupils or teachers regarded those in the jilbab as extremists or frightening is 
not a legitimate reason for restriction unless those fears can be objectively justified. 
If Ms Begum, or other jilbab wearers, could be accused of threatening behaviour, 
or of not respecting the rights of others who do not wear it, then the case would 
be different. However, that accusation was not made, and if it had been then the 
appropriate response might have been to deal with the unacceptable behaviour, 
rather than the clothing. After all, it is hard to imagine that prohibiting the jilbab 
changes the views or character of those who wish to wear it.25 By contrast, the 
head teacher, and their Lordships, seem to be treating the reactions of others as a 
per se legitimation for restriction,26 rather like the golf club which does not allow 
women, Jews or black people because it would disturb the other members. As one 
commentator said ‘that students claimed to fear those students wearing the jilbab 
is clearly not a good reason. Schools should not pander to prejudice’.27
The better argument concerned the risk that allowing the jilbab would cause girls 
to be pressured into wearing it, restricting their religious freedom. This is related 
to Baroness Hale’s view that schools should provide a place where children can be 
free of external religious demands. It is certainly a real potential risk, and should 
be taken seriously. However, it also demands a more critical examination than the 
House of Lords gave.
Firstly, the argument, even if correct, is not decisive on its own. The ECHR 
requires that the rights that a ban protects are balanced against the rights that it 
infringes – here Ms Begum’s.28 The school did not however even claim that it 
24 See Anthony, note 1 above.
25 Of course, the intention behind a ban might be to cause these pupils to leave the school, but there 
is no reason to think that was the case here, and it would not be an acceptable justification.
26 Especially para. 65, per Lord Hoffmann; ‘that takes no account of the school’s wish to avoid 
clothes which were perceived by some Muslims (rightly or wrongly) as signifying adherence to an 
extremist version of the Muslim religion’. The suggestion is that the justifiability of the perception 
is irrelevant.
27 Scolnicov, ‘A dedicated follower of (religious) fashion’ (2005) 64 CLJ 527 at 528. Contra, Lord 
Hoffmann, ibid.
28 Sahin, note 21 above at 107-108, and Judge Telkens. See also C. Evans, Freedom of Religion Under 
the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP, 2001) at 146-147; S. Van Drooghenbroeck, La 
Proportionnalité dan le Droit de la Convention Europeènne des Droits de l’Homme (Brussels: 
Bruylant, 2001); National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium (1979-80) 1 EHRR 578, at 579, 
where the Court asks whether ‘the disadvantage suffered by the applicant is excessive in relation 
to the legitimate aim pursued by the Government’. On the balances religious freedom requires 
see R. Fahlbeck, ‘Ora et Labora – On Freedom of Religion at the Work Place: A Stakeholder 
cum Balancing Factors Model’ (2004) 20 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations 27. See also (an ironic reference, in the circumstances) Lord Bingham at para. 
32.
430 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW
had weighed these against each other. It said that it had a policy acceptable to 
most Muslims, protective of some, and in the interest of the school as a whole 
and therefore she should accept it. The House of Lords, wrongly, accepted this as 
sufficient. 
Nor would such a balance be so very easy to make. As well as requiring some 
quantification of the numbers of girls likely to suffer or gain from a ban, one must 
ask whether it is worse to be forced by parents or peer pressure to wear something 
one dislikes than denied the right by a school to wear something one believes 
one should, or that modesty requires.29 This requires some awareness of equality 
issues, given the prohibition on discrimination in human rights found in Article 14 
ECHR. Is the seriousness attributed to the risk of girls being pressured into wearing 
the jilbab commensurate with the approach taken to teenagers whose families are 
strictly Christian or Jewish and also force them to dress according to certain norms 
of modesty.30 It is suggested that there is a certain discrepancy between widespread 
(and understandable) legal and social nonchalance about the latter, where the pres-
sures and power of family are accepted as inevitable, and something approaching 
panic about the former. Can this difference be justified? 
One would expect many of these points to raise evidential questions.31 The 
ban’s legitimacy cannot turn merely on an unsupported assertion of risk, but on 
whether these risks of pressure, of unrest, and of spreading extremism, are actually 
real and as significant as the school claimed.32 In the first instance judgment this 
was accepted on the basis of the evidence of several teachers, including the head 
teacher.33 However, their evidence was somewhat impressionistic, and relied to an 
extent on the expressed views of schoolgirls. While these are relevant, it should 
also be remembered that those girls opposing the jilbab are likely to have differing 
religious views to Ms Begum. Allowing one group of teenagers to assess the threat 
posed by a religiously different teenager has obvious risks. 
29 The position is of course compex, there being many reasons for wearing or not wearing religious 
clothes. See E. Tarlo, ‘Reconsidering Stereotypes: Anthropological Reflections on the Jilbab 
Controversy’ (2005) 21 Anthropology Today 13; D. Lyon and D. Spini, ‘Unveiling the Headscarf 
Debate’ (2004) 12 Feminist Legal Studies 333. On the question of modesty see Davies, ‘Banning 
the Jilbab’, note 1 above, at 526-527.
30 See Apps and Blair, note 1 above, on these equality issues.
31 On these evidential issues see S. Knight, ‘Religious Symbols in Schools: Freedom of Religion, 
Minorities and Education’ (2005) 51 EHRLRev 499 at 513-515.
32 See Judge Tulkens’ dissenting judgment in Sahin v. Turkey (Grand Chamber) on the importance 
of ‘in concreto’ evidence of a ‘pressing social need’ rather than just ‘abstract arguments’. Her 
judgment is probably the most carefully reasoned and coherent discussion of religious clothing 
that a court in Europe has yet produced. See also Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom (Application 
nos 33985/96 and 33986/96) where the European Court of Human Rights found that derogations 
from rights could not be justified by mere assertions of risk. Concrete and specific evidence was 
required. See para. 89 of the judgment, and further citations therein.
33 Begum, note 1 above.
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Indeed, Ms Begum is a member of a minority of British Muslims, although 
a significant group globally, who prefer the jilbab to the shalwar kameeze and 
headscarf. She found herself in a school where most of the other girls, and the 
head teacher, came from a tradition in which these latter are normal wear for 
Muslim women. In that situation the tolerance that the school showed for the 
shalwar kameeze and headscarf, and the head teacher’s own background, should 
be reasons for critical examination of the policy quite as much as they are evidence 
of its tolerance and wisdom.34 They raise the spectre of intra-religious intolerance. 
That is particularly the case given that one of the arguments put forward against 
the jilbab was that it would create divisions in the school. There were of course 
already divisions; between girls who wore the headscarf and those who did not. 
Why should a new division between headscarf and jilbab be so problematic? Could 
it be that the mainstream religious group has a particular difficulty with minority 
branches? That would not be so very surprising. However, as the European Court 
of Human Rights has said, the appropriate response in such a case is to create a 
context in which different groups get along, not to eliminate the presence of the 
groups which the majority dislike.35 
Yet by contrast, the fact that the uniform policy was acceptable to the majority 
was used by the school, and the House of Lords, to undermine Ms Begum’s 
position. She was assimilated to the mainstream with striking ease. Perhaps there 
was no prejudice involved, and it is certainly not the intention here to make any 
accusation, but the attitude of the majority to the minority deserved consideration. 
Can one imagine a Catholic interpretation of the Bible being accepted by a court 
as support for restricting expression of a contrary Protestant view? 
With their lack of critical or probing analysis, the judgments are in substance 
an endorsement of a marginal review of the school’s decision. Lord Bingham was 
explicit and representative in thinking it appropriate to defer to the head teacher’s 
expertise,36 and Lord Hoffmann considered that the decentralization of the dress 
codes to schools meant that the margin of appreciation should be considered to 
be decentralised too.37 It is clear that her personal qualities and ability as a head 
teacher played an important role here. Both her background as a Muslim, and her 
good record as head, were taken as reasons for deference.38 
These may certainly be relevant, but it is suggested that most readers of the 
judgments will find the degree of emphasis on the head teacher’s excellence slightly 
odd, even disturbing. Even excellent teachers can make errors of judgment,39 and 
34 See Davies, ‘Banning the Jilbab’, note 1 above, at 526.
35 Sahin, note 21 above, Grand Chamber Judgment at para. 107, and citations therein.
36 Paras 33-34.
37 Paras 63-64.
38 See paras 5, 33-34, 43.
39 On deference to teachers see D. Monk, ‘(Re)constructing the head teacher: legal narratives and the 
politics of school exclusions’ (2005) 32 Law and Society 399.
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the ad personem argument is given too much weight. This impression is increased 
by a number of disapproving references to Ms Begum’s attitude, and that of her 
brothers, and in particular to their attempts to invoke human rights arguments.40 
While an assertive pupil may not always be attractive to authority it is suggested 
that the disapproving tone taken by their Lordships is regrettable. How are rights to 
be protected if they cannot be asserted? In any case, it is not clear what relevance 
Ms Begum’s likeability, or that of her brothers, has to her case.41
4. Conclusion
Their Lordships seem to have conflated two issues. One is the degree of discretion 
which a decision-maker should have, which it is suggested they were right to think 
is broad. The other is the intensity with which a court should examine whether the 
correct factors were considered in exercising that discretion. Here Lord Bingham 
stated that a higher intensity was appropriate than for normal judicial review, but 
the judgments do not reflect this, because of over-reliance on the teacher’s assess-
ments. The consequent risk, which these judgments manifest, is that decisions 
which do not accord sufficient respect to rights will not be exposed because review 
is superficial, but this will be treated as a margin of discretion matter. Schools may 
be allowed variation in value choices and balancing, but to ensure the protection of 
rights courts must engage in review sufficiently intense to establish what choices 
and balances the school has in fact made. 
Further, in rejecting as too complex the Court of Appeal’s procedural constraints 
on decision-making, the House of Lords seems to have relieved schools of any 
obligation to consider religious freedom as such. This may make their life easier, 
but it also makes it more likely that decisions will be unbalanced, and marginal 
risks will be used to justify disproportionate restrictions. Deference to head teachers 
will make this hard to expose, and the procedural bathwater may carry away the 
baby of substantive and enforceable rights.
40 Paras 10, 46, 79-80.
41 See Monk, note 38 above.
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